ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Who Authors a Right? Recognition, Authorship, and Privacy Policy in India, 1954-2024

Public Policy Studies
Political Organizations and Institutions
Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Transitions
Abhinav Srivastav
Indian Institute of Management
Swarn Rajan
Abhinav Srivastav
Indian Institute of Management

Abstract

Courts are credited with creating rights. This paper attempts to separate two acts of literature which run together: recognizing a right and authoring its content. Recognition is an event: dated, attributable, and precedented. Authorship is slow and diffuse process, performed by drafters who answer no electorate and decide no case. Where the two come apart, a right is settled somewhere other than where we look for it. They came apart in India. In August 2017 a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court held privacy to be a fundamental right. Six years later Parliament passed the Digital Personal Data Protection Act. Constitutional silence to Constitutional right to codified statute, were noted in a single generation. Yet six years on, only one in six Indians had heard of the right it created. We treat the right as a policy output and trace it through every institution that made it. The corpus covers India from 1954 to 2024: 318 Supreme Court judgments and the 1,246 citations between them, 259 provisions from 13 statutes and bills, 16 major Parliamentary debates, and 7 Committee reports. Computational text analysis establishes the pattern across the four registers. Close reading of the decisions those methods rank highest establishes the mechanism. The research finds that the Court recognized privacy and kept reasoning about the body. Its jurisprudence is retrofitted rather than built: four of the five decisions the network ranks most authoritative predate 1978, and 61.5 per cent of citations in post-2017 judgments still run backwards to pre-2017 authority. Informational privacy was authored elsewhere. Expert committees drafted it, Parliament contested it, the Statute enacted it, and it is thinnest in the register where the right was recognized. The division is functional rather than consensual. Where the registers overlap, they pull apart, and the data-localization mandate the committees required did not survive into the Act. Analyzing the judgments explains the Court's absence. It was not reticent about informational privacy but unasked. Indian privacy litigation generated claims about the body and the criminal trial, and informational claims reached the Court only when the national identity system or the Aadhar was challenged. Courts adjudicate on what litigants bring before them, which is why the institution that recognized the right could not write it. The design has a cost. A population-representative survey of 9,779 Indians records four in five supporting the linkage of the Aadhar to other services and more than three in five supporting facial recognition to identify protesters, while two-thirds fear their personal data will be misused. A consent-based statute answers the anxiety and cannot reach the endorsement, because consent is not the instrument at work when citizens welcome the programme collecting the data. The failure is one of transfer, not of drafting. The consent-and-rights template has diffused into jurisdictions whose privacy politics formed around other problems, and India is where the seams show. The paper locates each, and challenges accounts of judicialization that credit courts with making rights