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How and why Australian parliaments fall short of democratic benchmarks in the Commonwealth; and is reform possible?

Public Policy Studies
Political Organizations and Institutions
Comparative Politics
Andrew Young
Deakin University
Andrew Young
Deakin University

Abstract

Australia’s federal, state and territory systems of representative parliamentary government are looked upon favourably, at an international level, in terms of the processes that elect representatives. Professional and independent electoral commissions, high voter turnout and independent judicial review of disputed results are just some of the significant strengths of the electoral systems in Australia. The separation of the parliamentary and judicial branches of the system of government in Australian jurisdictions has and continues to be relatively consistent with international principles. The separation of executive government and the judiciary is also relatively healthy in Australia, notwithstanding the separation of the judiciary from the parliament and the executive branches of government relies significantly on mutual restraint. The less well understood aspect of our systems of parliamentary government in Australia is how poorly most of our parliaments rate against basic benchmarks of separation of parliament and executive government, accountability of executive government to parliament and administrative independence that is necessary to give effect to these principles. Benchmarks for democratic parliaments in Australia come largely from three sources: The Latimer House Principles (separation of three branches of government) adopted by Commonwealth Heads of Government; the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association’s Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures; and evolving better practice in Commonwealth jurisdictions. There are numerous impediments to meeting benchmarks in Australian jurisdictions. Executive governments dominate parliaments, particularly lower houses, which places a disproportionate burden on upper houses (where they exist) to be the sole forum for scrutiny of government, while parliamentary departments have little power to ensure they have the financial and administrative resources required. Party discipline diminishes the incentive for Members to be ‘parliamentarians’ who assert the independence of the institution and their own autonomy as elected representatives. There is deficient civic education and institutional knowledge of Members of parliament and senior government officials, who fail to understand the system of the three branches of government (separation of powers) that they are part of. These problems matter, because parliament is ultimately meant to be at the core of integrity, accountability and law-making in our democratic system. The question of how to fix these problems is complex. The sovereignty of parliament and its Members means that awareness, education and cultural change within parliaments and governments are essential precursors to positive rule and law reforms. These problems and questions are examined from the perspective of a member of Deakin’s Parliamentary Research Unit, former parliamentary officer and current consultant on parliamentary projects in Australia and the Commonwealth.