This paper examines how domestic political change shapes African governments’ (non-)cooperation with EUrope (the European Union and its member states) on migration, focusing on the influence of domestic institutions, societal actors, and historical trajectories. It compares The Gambia and Tunisia—two countries central to EU externalisation efforts but with contrasting regime trajectories: democratic transition in The Gambia and autocratisation in Tunisia. While Gambian agreements have predominantly targeted citizens (forced readmissions), Tunisian cooperation has centred on border controls, targeting non-citizens.
The analysis contributes to theory development by retaining the liberal insight that foreign policy arises from domestic politics, while replacing its neo-utilitarian ontology with Joas’ neo-pragmatism. Action is given ontological primacy, understood as non-teleological, situated, and inherently creative. Migration agreements are traced as ongoing action-processes rather than discrete outcomes.
Methodologically, the paper employs a comparative case study design using process tracing, drawing on original fieldwork (2023–2024). It demonstrates that migration diplomacy is co-shaped by domestic politics, with implementation restructuring domestic (social) institutions and producing antidemocratic consequences. In The Gambia, public contestation and institutional fluidity enabled the suspension of forced returns, while in Tunisia, institutional closure facilitated more coercive cooperation.
The paper cautions against treating African states as passive recipients of EU pressure, underscoring the need for context-sensitive, empirically grounded analyses of migration governance. It highlights how institutional openness or closure shapes actor access to policymaking and the framing of agreements domestically; equally; it shows how EUropean foreign policy influences domestic politics and might enable authoritarian shifts.
