Why has Indonesia’s China policy shifted from economic pragmatism under Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to a more comprehensive partnership under Prabowo Subianto? Since 2014, China has remained Indonesia’s largest trading partner and a top source of investment for national development, whereas United States-China competition has produced comparable structural pressures on Jakarta’s strategy. However, there has been a clear pattern of both change and continuity under the Prabowo administration. In contrast to Jokowi’s economically driven China policy, Prabowo’s engagement has expanded to security, technology, and politics. This article argues that the variation cannot be explained at the systemic level and locates the explanation in Prabowo's perception of China’s role, shaped by his military background, his mobilisation of anti-China sentiment as an opposition figure, and his current domestic political standing. Tracing key milestones of Prabowo’s first two years in office, the article examines how leaders’ perceptions filter systemic incentives into foreign policy outcomes and shows how neoclassical realism can account for foreign policy change across leaderships.
