Businesses have been central to climate obstruction for decades. Studies have highlighted the role that firms— and to a lesser extent trade associations—play in opposing climate policies. But is this the full extent of business opposition to climate policy? In this paper, we contribute to the literature on business opposition to climate policy by analysing the role of third parties with whom businesses contract to delegate their political activities, such as lobbying firms, public relations firms, and consultancies. Building on previous research, we distinguish between inside and outside political activities and show that trade associations contract out different types of political activities in response to different factors. We focus on three factors: the financial resources of the industry; the salience of climate policies to that industry; and the industry’s reputation. The theory we develop explains not only how trade association convert their resources into inside and outside political activities via third parties, but also why. To test our theory, we assemble an original dataset of 4,000 contracts totalling more than US$5 billion between trade associations and third parties between 2008 and 2024, sourced from the US Internal Revenue Service.
