In the context of intensifying geopolitical tensions, notably between China and the US, but also involving other major powers, like Russia and India, most researchers agree that ‘middle ground’ countries prefer not to choose sides, but to continue seeking beneficial engagements with as many external powers as possible. This has directed attention to identifying the domestic factors that shape the contours of middle ground countries’ external engagements. This article focuses instead on the significance of what external actors are actually offering. Many scholars assume that great power rivals are competing for the allegiance of middle ground countries, but this is not always the case, potentially undermining the latter’s efforts to avoid choosing sides. To demonstrate this argument, we offer the case of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has long been portrayed as a battleground for geopolitical struggles involving the US and India, on the one hand, and China on the other. Successive Sri Lankan governments have also long tried to ‘polyalign’ between these sides. From the early 2020s, as Sri Lanka approached economic crisis and ultimately defaulted on its external debt, China has largely disengaged, forcing Sri Lanka to become increasingly dependent on India. This is despite India’s relatively modest offer, and the Indian government’s willingness to interfere in Sri Lanka’s domestic affairs. Sri Lanka’s pivot towards India has increased under Sri Lanka’s current National People’s Power government, which originated from the revolutionary JVP movement, long seen as pro-Chinese, anti-Indian and anti-Western. This case study illustrates the constraints on polyalignment imposed by great powers’ limited offers in the current geopolitical moment.
