Ethnic Nationalism and Limits of Federalism in Multinational States: Evidence from Ethiopia

The presentation examines the limits of federalism as a mechanism for managing ethnic nationalism in multinational states, using Ethiopia as a case study. Existing scholarship has devoted considerable attention to institutional design, arguing that the success or failure of federal systems depends largely on constitutional arrangements such as territorial autonomy, power-sharing, and minority representation. While these institutional factors are important, I argue that such explanations are incomplete because they underestimate the influence of underlying social structures that shape the operation of federal institutions. Building on Manuel Vogt's distinction between stratified and unstratified multiethnic systems, I contend that the conflict-management capacity of federalism depends fundamentally on the nature of interethnic relations, patterns of territorial settlement, and competing conceptions of state legitimacy. The presentation draws on a qualitative case study of Ethiopia, combining constitutional and political analysis, an extensive review of the literature, and original interview data collected from political leaders, legal experts, academics, and civil society representatives. I show that Ethiopia represents an unstratified and highly segmented multinational society characterised by territorially concentrated ethnic communities, limited cross-cutting social and political cleavages, contested ownership of the state, and shifting patterns of ethnic domination. These structural conditions have constrained the capacity of Ethiopia's ethnic federal system to manage conflict despite its extensive constitutional recognition of ethnic autonomy and self-government. I argue that, rather than reducing ethnic tensions, federalism has frequently reinforced ethnic boundaries, intensified competition over territory and political power, and strengthened rival ethnic nationalist projects. The Ethiopian experience suggests that institutional arrangements alone cannot generate political stability where the social foundations necessary for accommodation and compromise are weak. In such contexts, constitutional engineering may alleviate some grievances but is unlikely to resolve deeply rooted conflicts over identity, sovereignty, and political power. By integrating institutional and sociological perspectives, this presentation contributes to debates on federalism and ethnic conflict by moving beyond questions of constitutional design. It demonstrates that the effectiveness of federalism depends not only on the formal distribution of powers but also on the broader social context within which institutions operate. The findings have implications beyond Ethiopia, raising broader questions about the long-term viability of multinational federal states in deeply segmented and unstratified societies and highlighting the importance of incorporating societal structure more systematically into theories of conflict management and constitutional design.