This paper examines dual-use innovation undertaken by two or more states within security alignments. While militaries have long been deeply involved in dual-use innovations, modern approaches differ in two significant ways. First, start-ups and small and medium enterprises are now much more highly involved in the development of defense-related technologies, and states are increasingly committing to funding structures that facilitate extensive startup participation. Second, bilateral and multilateral security agreements increasingly include commitments to joint initiatives for dual-use innovation. I argue that because these innovation structures are largely without precedent in the international system, and because these changes present major implications for state and firm power, a reevaluation of the roles of states and firms in the practice of security is needed.
As defense-related innovation has thus far been undertaken almost exclusively in the domestic context, with occasional mergers and partnerships between private actors, the literature pertaining to military involvement in dual-use innovation has not yet considered the impact of multi-state initiatives. In addition, strategic competition between the US and China has created the conditions, but not yet meaningfully revived the debate concerning internal and external processes leading to defense-related innovation and arms racing, last seen toward the end of the Cold War.
I undertake qualitative analysis of multi-state innovation initiatives following a process tracing method to create a practical typology of collaboration which can be used to evaluate the much larger and still-emerging ecosystem of innovation projects. The typology presents four categories, each with a representative case study: the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), AUKUS Pillar II, the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise (GWEO), and the Defense Industrial Base Accelerator (DIBX). In addition, I develop a theoretical framework for the evaluation of state and firm roles in these initiatives, drawing on theories of organizational logic and organizational culture. The framework serves as a tool for evaluating changes in state and firm behavior that are indicative of crossover between each party’s role as a security provider or profit seeker. Preliminary results provide evidence of changing organizational logic and culture in both states and firms, which suggests that current theories do not properly conceptualize the impacts of defense-related innovation.
This paper explores a relatively new and quickly expanding international phenomenon that has the potential to shape future conflict and economic success. Through an understanding of how states and firms approach innovation in dual-use technology, paths to conflict and cooperation under strategic competition are illuminated.
