Strategic Signalling by Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific: Case of India and Australia in the South China Sea

Located in the Western Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea (SCS) forms a critical link within the broader Indo-Pacific maritime region. As a vital artery of global commerce and host to major sea lines of communication, the SCS carries nearly one-third of global maritime trade. At the same time, it has emerged as a strategic arena for maritime coercion, power projection, and normative contestation. Overlapping territorial claims, the militarisation of maritime features, and challenges to freedom of navigation have transformed the SCS into a focal point of security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. In this increasingly contested environment, states employ strategic signalling to communicate intent, deter adversaries, reassure partners, and shape regional norms through actions short of armed conflict. Existing scholarship on the SCS has largely concentrated on great power rivalry, particularly between the United States and China. Consequently, the strategic signalling behaviour of middle powers remains underexplored. This paper seeks to address that gap by examining the behaviour of India and Australia, two influential middle powers in the Indo-Pacific. Although neither country is a direct claimant in the SCS disputes, both have become increasingly involved due to concerns surrounding international law, freedom of navigation, and the regional balance of power, particularly in response to China’s growing assertiveness. In recent years, both New Delhi and Canberra have engaged in strategic signalling through diplomatic messaging, naval deployments, defence cooperation, and multilateral engagements. For example, in April 2024, India delivered the first batch of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to the Philippines, marking India’s first major defence export. This growing maritime partnership was further reflected in the Philippines’ first participation in India-hosted naval engagements, including IFR 2026 and MILAN 2026 in Visakhapatnam, which saw the deployment of the Philippine frigate BRP Miguel Malvar. Similarly, in August 2025, Australia and the Philippines launched Exercise Alon 2025, one of their largest joint military exercises in the SCS. These developments illustrate how middle powers increasingly use calibrated strategic actions to signal commitment, strengthen partnerships, and shape the regional security environment. Importantly, both India and Australia project themselves as normative powers that support a free and open Indo-Pacific. Their emphasis on capacity-building initiatives, defence assistance, joint naval exercises, and advocacy for a rules-based maritime order demonstrates that middle powers are not merely reactive actors but active participants in shaping regional dynamics. These actions, therefore, provide valuable cases for understanding how middle powers engage in strategic signalling within contested regions such as the SCS. Against this backdrop, the paper aims to advance understanding of middle-power strategic signalling in the SCS by analysing the behaviour of India and Australia. It will examine patterns of signalling, areas of convergence and divergence in their approaches, and the broader implications of their actions for regional order and Indo-Pacific security. Ultimately, the study highlights how middle powers actively shape the strategic environment through signalling practices rather than simply responding to great power competition.